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COMMENTARY I VIEWPOINTS

be a bad outcome given our nation's need to
increase the domestic savings rate to finance the
installation of productivity-improving capital in our
businesses, and to lessen our dependence on for
eign sources of finance. Again, more broadly and
alternatively, there are many small changes in
scheduled benefits and system revenues that can be
made together, so that Social Security can be put on
a financially sustainable base for the long run,
without the need for increasing payroll taxes. 3
An appropriate, specific technical improvement
to the current method of calculating the average
wage index that would produce a fairer program is
to use the earnings (wages and self-employment
income) just of workers with earnings below a fixed
percentile in the earnings distribution, say 94 per
cent, reflecting historical norms.4 More fundamen
tally, a better approach to guide the structure of
Social Security payroll taxes in reform proposals is
to eschew arbitrary goals, like the one targeting
total taxable earnings to be 90 percent of aggregate
earnings. Instead we should tie the type and levels
of revenues used to fund the Social Security pro
gram with the design and purpose of a universal
government program providing modest levels of
retirement, survivors, and disability insurance. Fair
ness is an appropriate consideration here, and sug
gests both tying the benefit earned to the amount
paid in, as well as some redistribution of retirement
resources to those with low lifetime earnings. Re
distribution itself should also be done fairly, how
ever, unlike the deficit reduction commissions'
proposals.

3
My suggestion summarized in a recent article is one such
proposal. "A Pro-Growth and Progressive Social Security Re
form Proposal," Tax Notes, Jan. 12, 2009, p. 283, Doc 2008-26247,
or 2009 TNT 7-51. (For a full description and score of the
proposal, see http:/ /www.ssa.gov/OACT/solvency, memo
dated Sept. 17, 2008.) It includes raising the normal retirement
age gradually, including state and local government workers in
the program, reforming the disability insurance program, and
so on.
4
Note also that this fix would have prevented the recent
mistake by the SSA in the calculation of the average wage index
whereby a few erroneous tax form filings purporting astronomi
cal earning levels were entered into the system and skewed the
published average wage index until an external source reported
the error, and the SSA did a correction. (For prior coverage, see
Tax Notes, Nov. 8, 2010, p. 735, Doc 2010 -23596, or 2010 TNT
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Introduction

The code contains several special provisions gov
erning valuable intellectual property assets, such as
patents, copyrights, and trademarks. Some of these
special provisions address a large group of intellec
tual property assets1; most, however, address only a
specific type of intellectual property.2 Although
these special tax rules were largely designed to
address the shortcomings of traditional taxation
principles in the intellectual property context,3
many special tax rules are circumscribed in ways
that relegate the tax analysis back to these tradi
tional principles. Thus, the income tax system gov
erning intellectual property is a mix of special tax
rules and general tax principles.
Ideally, the intellectual property tax system
should embrace the principle of fairness. Tax fair
ness is usually described in terms of horizontal
equity, which requires that persons who are simi
larly situated be taxed in a similar fashion.4 A

215-6.)
1

See, e.g., sections 167(g)(6), 170(e)(1)(B)(iii) and (m), and 197.
e.g., sections 41, 167(f)(1), 167(g)(8), 174, 263A(h),
1221(a)(3), 1221(b)(3), 1235, and 1253.
3
See Xuan Thao Nguyen and Jeffrey A. Maine, "The History
of Intellectual Property Taxation: Promoting Innovation and
Other IP Goals?" 64 SMU L. Rev. _ (2010) (forthcoming).
4
See John A. Miller and Maine, The Fundamentals of Federal
Taxation 4 (2d ed. 2010); Michael J. Graetz and Deborah H.
Schenk, Federal Income Taxation: Principles and Policies 28 (6th ed.
(Footnote continued on next page.)
2See,
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The utility of horizontal equity in tax policy
analysis has come under attack in recent years.6
Some critics point to the difficulty in determining
relevant likeness (that is, the comparison of tax
payers and economic activities).7 Requiring equal
tax treatment for equals, they argue, begs the ques
tion of what equals actually are. For example, is the
seller of a copyright on a novel equal to a seller of a
copyright on a song? This criticism, however, rests
on an ‘‘exaggerated view of the level of precision
required in order for equality to have meaning.’’8 As
suggested by one commentator, ‘‘horizontal equity
is concerned with individuals who are ‘similarly
situated,’ not with those who are ‘identically situ
ated.’’’9 Moreover, even if this criticism of horizon

2009). For early treatments, see Richard A. Musgrave, The Theory
of Public Finance: A Study in Public Economy 160 (1959) (‘‘Perhaps
the most widely accepted principle of equity in taxation is that
people in equal positions should be treated equally’’); Henry C.
Simons, Federal Tax Reform 11 (1950) (‘‘Equity in this primary
sense must, in an advanced nation, predominate over, if not
wholly override, all other objectives’’); see also Joseph T. Sneed,
‘‘The Criteria of Federal Income Tax Policy,’’ 17 Stan. L. Rev. 567,
574-580 (1965).
5
See Jeffrey H. Kahn, ‘‘The Mirage of Equivalence and the
Ethereal Principles of Parallelism and Horizontal Equity,’’ 57
Hastings L.J. 645, 647 (2006) (using the term ‘‘parallelism’’ for the
proposition that ‘‘the same or equivalent receipts, expenditures
or losses should be treated the same by the tax law’’); Eric M.
Zolt, ‘‘The Uneasy Case for Uniform Taxation,’’ 16 Va. Tax Rev.
39, 49 (1996) (using the term ‘‘uniform taxation,’’ which rests on
the concept of horizontal equity, ‘‘to refer to tax treatment in
accordance with some general approach . . . without any differ
entiation as to type of income or type of taxpayer ’’).
6
See generally Paul R. McDaniel and James R. Repetti, ‘‘Hori
zontal and Vertical Equity: The Musgrave/Kaplow Exchange,’’
1 Fla. Tax Rev. 607 (1993); see also Anthony C. Infanti, ‘‘Tax
Equity,’’ 55 Buff. L. Rev. 1191, 1193-1194 (2008); Eric M. Zolt, ‘‘The
Uneasy Case for Uniform Taxation,’’ 16 Va. Tax Rev. 39, 89-97
(1996) (summarizing criticisms of horizontal equity).
7
McDaniel and Repetti, supra note 6, at 612-613; Zolt, supra
note 6, at 95 (‘‘Defining horizontal equity as requiring equal tax
treatment for individuals who are, in all relevant aspects, equal
accomplishes little. It just begs the question of what is
relevant. . . . The principle of horizontal equity does nothing to
determine which differences justify different tax treatment’’).
8
John A. Miller, ‘‘Equal Taxation: A Commentary,’’ 29 Hofstra
L. Rev. 529, 545 (2000) (‘‘All of our major tax schemes have found
ways to determine likeness (or difference) that are generally
recognized as fair ’’).
9
David Elkins, ‘‘Horizontal Equity as a Principle of Tax
Theory,’’ 24 Yale L. & Pol’y Rev. 43, 44 (2006) (‘‘Tautologically, any
conceivable tax arrangement will treat identically situated tax
payers equally. . . . Taxpayers are similarly situated when their
situations are considered equivalent’’).
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tal equity is valid, horizontal equity can still serve
as a useful tool to uncover potential problems in the
intellectual property tax regime.10 To use the ex
ample above, the tax system’s different treatment of
literary copyrights and musical copyrights might
signal a flaw in the intellectual property tax system,
or it might at least challenge us to justify disparate
treatment.11
This article evaluates the intellectual property tax
regime in terms of horizontal equity. In the eight
examples that follow, we highlight differences in tax
treatment of what appear to be similar intellectual
property transactions. We believe that many of
these tax distinctions lack theoretical justification,
suggesting legislative or administrative changes
may be warranted. Ideally, the government should
establish a sound basis for making tax distinctions
for intangible intellectual property rights if distinc
tions are to be adopted and maintained.
Unequal Tax Treatment of IP Development
Example 1: Patent Development. Inventor A
and Inventor B each spend $100 to develop a
patented invention. Inventor A plans to enter a
future business of her own with her developed
technology and market the technology herself.
Inventor B, however, plans to license her de
veloped technology to a company that will
market the developed technology to its cus
tomers.
Inventor A and Inventor B appear similarly situ
ated; each spends $100 and each obtains patent
protections for similar technologies that will be
exploited in the commercial marketplace. Never
theless, under the present tax system, Inventor A
and Inventor B are not treated equally. Inventor A
may deduct $100 in research costs, but Inventor B
may not.
This disparate treatment stems from section 174,
which allows a deduction for research expenditures

10

See Kahn, supra note 5, at 651.
Many commentators have recently defended horizontal
equity as an important principle of tax theory despite the
criticisms noted above. See, e.g., Samuel A. Donaldson, ‘‘The
Easy Case Against Tax Simplification,’’ 22 Va. Tax Rev. 645 (2003)
(arguing that equity and efficiency, as opposed to simplicity, are
core values); Elkins, supra note 9 (showing independence of
horizontal equity as a principle of tax theory); Brian Galle, ‘‘Tax
Fairness,’’ 65 Wash. & Lee. L. Rev. 1323, 1328, 1335-1362 (2008)
(providing justifications for tax fairness and claiming that
horizontal equity ‘‘can be defended as an essential feature of the
revenue function of taxation’’ and can operate on principles of
its own); Kahn, supra note 5 (recognizing that equal treatment of
the same items serves the normative goal of fairness, but
arguing that parallelism need not necessarily prevail over other
legitimate goals); Miller, supra note 8 (discussing the merits of
horizontal equity analysis).
11

(C) Tax Analysts 2011. All rights reserved. Tax Analysts does not claim copyright in any public domain or third party content.

related concept is that economically equivalent ac
tivities should be taxed in the same manner even if
they differ in form.5 Under horizontal equity, two
patent owners who are similarly situated, or two
copyright owners whose situations are similar,
should be taxed in a similar fashion.
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In a recent case, the Ninth Circuit affirmed a Tax
Court decision that denied deductions to a com
puter software developer who did not market the
developed technology himself, but instead licensed
the technology to another company for use in that
company’s trade or business.16 A few Tax Court
decisions have held that research activities, and
exploitation of the resulting inventions by sale or
license, may constitute a trade or business.17 These

12

Section 174(a). A current deduction is not available under
section 162 because of section 263. Section 263(a); reg. section
1.263(a)-4.
13
Snow v. Commissioner, 416 U.S. 500, 503-504 (1974).
14
See Kantor v. Commissioner, 998 F.2d 1514, 1518 (9th Cir.
1993) (‘‘The taxpayer must demonstrate a ‘realistic prospect’ of
subsequently entering its own business in connection with the
fruits of the research, assuming that the research is successful’’);
see also Zink v. United States, 929 F.2d 1015, 1023 (5th Cir. 1991);
Spellman v. Commissioner, 845 F.2d 148, 149-150 (7th Cir. 1988);
Stauber v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1992-128; Diamond v. Com
missioner, 92 T.C. 423, 439 (1989), aff’d, 930 F.2d 372 (4th Cir.
1991).
15
See Kantor, 998 F.2d at 1518-1519 (holding that the partner
ship possessed neither ‘‘the objective intent nor the capacity of
entering such a business’’ at the time it incurred research
expenditures); Diamond, 930 F.2d at 375 (‘‘The question is not
whether it is possible in principle, or by further contract, for [the
taxpayer] to engage in a trade or business, but whether, in
reality, the [taxpayer] possessed the capability in the years
before the court to enter into a new trade or business in
connection with the ‘‘products being developed’’); Glassley v.
Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1996-206, Doc 96-12999, 96 TNT 86-10
(denying section 174 deductions for expenditures to develop
jojoba plants and seeds because taxpayer had neither intent nor
capability to enter jojoba farming business).
16
Saykally v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2003-152, Doc 2003
13075, 2003 TNT 102-11, aff’d, 247 F. App’x 914 (9th Cir. 2007).
17
See Kilroy v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1980-489 (permitting
deductions when actions, over a period of years, relating to
inventing activities suggested taxpayers were engaged in the
trade or business of inventing); Louw v. Commissioner, T.C.
Memo. 1971-326 (1971) (permitting deductions since taxpayer’s
freelance inventive activities were of sufficiently sustained
character to qualify as engaging in a trade or business of an
inventor); see also Avery v. Commissioner, 47 B.T.A. 538, 542 (1942)
(permitting business deductions when taxpayer ‘‘held the pat
ents [to his inventions] for sale or license to others for profit’’).
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cases, however, involved inventors that had devel
oped several inventions.18
The unequal tax treatment of the novice inven
tors in the example highlights a fundamental prob
lem with section 174; namely it fails to recognize the
importance of technology licensing in today’s
economy and favors only inventive activities of a
sufficiently sustained character.
Example 2: Copyright Creation. ABC Inc.
spends $100 to develop copyrighted books.
EFG Inc. spends $100 to develop copyrighted
software. XYZ Inc. spends $100 to create copy
righted package designs used in advertising.
In general, costs incurred in creating works that
are subject to copyright protection are not deduct
ible but must be capitalized.19 Congress has carved
out a narrow exception for specified costs incurred
by individual writers, photographers, and artists
when engaged in their trades.20 As a result, ex
penses incurred by an individual author in writing
a book are deductible, but similar creative costs
incurred by a book publishing company (costs of
writing, editing, and designing) must be capital
ized.
Although corporate taxpayers must generally
capitalize copyright creation costs, capitalization is
not required if the subject of copyright protection is
computer software21 or certain advertising materi
als.22 As a result, a corporation may not deduct the
costs of developing copyrighted books, films, or
songs, but it may deduct the costs of developing

18
See Kilroy, T.C. Memo. 1980-489 (‘‘numerous patents’’);
Avery, 47 B.T.A. at 540 (‘‘about a dozen patents’’). But see
Cleveland v. Commissioner, 297 F.2d 169, 173 (4th Cir. 1961)
(deeming a single invention held by a joint venture to be
sufficient).
19
Section 174 does not apply to copyright creation expenses
because those expenses do not constitute ‘‘research and experi
mental expenditures’’ within the meaning of section 174. See reg.
section 1.174-2(a)(1)-(3). Section 162 generally does not apply to
copyright creation costs because the code requires such costs to
be capitalized. Section 263(a), 263A(a)-(b); reg. section
1.263(a)-4.
20
Section 263A(h).
21
Under a long-standing administrative ruling, software
development costs are treated the same (currently deductible)
regardless of whether the software is protected by patent,
copyright, or trade secret. See Rev. Proc. 69-21, 1969-2 C.B. 303,
updated by Rev. Proc. 2000-50, 2000-2 C.B. 601, Doc 2000-31079,
2000 TNT 233-11, modified and superseded by Rev. Proc. 2007-16,
2007-1 C.B. 358, Doc 2006-25669, 2006 TNT 248-9.
22
As a general rule, the government allows taxpayers to
deduct advertising costs currently even though advertising
often produces benefits that continue well beyond the current
tax year. See Rev. Rul. 92-80, 1992-2 C.B. 57; RJR Nabisco Inc. v.
Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1998-252, Doc 98-21920, 98 TNT 131-5
(allowing trade dress and copyright development costs incurred
in an advertising campaign to be deducted).
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(C) Tax Analysts 2011. All rights reserved. Tax Analysts does not claim copyright in any public domain or third party content.

incurred ‘‘in connection with’’ the inventor’s ‘‘trade
or business.’’12 While a taxpayer need not be cur
rently conducting a business (that is, producing or
selling any product) for research expenditures to
meet section 174’s trade or business requirement,13
courts have required that a taxpayer show a realistic
prospect of entering into a trade or business in the
future that will exploit the technology under devel
opment.14 To do so, the taxpayer must demonstrate
both an objective intent to enter into the trade or
business and the ability to perform the business.15
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In short, legislative and administrative exceptions
to the general asset capitalization rule produce dif
ferent tax results depending on the status (indi
vidual or corporation) of the copyright creator and
in some cases, on the nature of the property em
bodying the copyright. The result in the example is
that ABC cannot currently deduct its copyright cre
ation costs, but EFG and XYZ may. Ironically, the
value produced in each case lies not in the different
tangibles embodying the copyrights, but in the in
tangible copyright protections themselves.23 Never
theless, even though the copyright protections are
identical in each case, the tax consequences to the
corporate creators differ significantly.
Unequal Tax Treatment of IP Acquisition
Inequities in the tax treatment of intellectual
property acquisition costs are also prevalent. Under
the current tax system, the costs of acquiring intel
lectual property must first be capitalized24 and then
are subject to numerous irrational tax depreciation
rules.25 The methods and periods for recovering
capitalized intellectual property acquisition costs
vary by the type of intellectual property acquired,
the manner of procurement, and even the method
of payment. The depreciation rules for intellectual
property raise some equity concerns, as illustrated
in the two examples that follow.
Example 3: Patent Purchase for Lump Sum
Payment. Individual A purchases a patent for
$100 as part of the acquisition of a business.
Individual B purchases a similar patent for
$100 (not part of the acquisition of a business).
Prescribed cost-recovery periods for intellectual
property range from three to 15 years, depending
on the type of intellectual property acquired and the
manner of procurement: 15 years for all acquired
trade secrets, trademarks, and trade names26; 15
years for patents, copyrights, and computer soft
ware acquired with a trade or business27; five years

23
Copyright owners enjoy the exclusive right to make copies,
prepare derivative works, distribute the copyrighted work, and
publicly perform and display the work. See Sony Corp. of America
v. Universal City Studios Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 432-433 (1984).
24
Section 263; reg. section 1.263(a)-4(b)(1)(i) and -4(c)(1) (‘‘A
taxpayer must capitalize amounts paid to another party to
acquire any intangible [property] from that party in a purchase
or similar transaction’’).
25
Sections 197 and 167. For a critique of the tax system’s
treatment of intellectual property acquisitions, see Nguyen and
Maine, ‘‘Acquiring Innovation,’’ 57 Am. U. L. Rev. 775 (2008).
26
Section 197(a) and (d)(1)(F); reg. section 1.197-2(b)(5).
27
Section 197(a) and (d)(1)(C)(iii); reg. section 1.197-2(b)(5).
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for separately acquired musical copyrights28; and
three years for separately acquired computer soft
ware.29 A fixed recovery period is not prescribed for
patents and copyrights acquired separately.30 In
stead, the capitalized costs of these assets are recov
ered using one of two approaches: (1) over their
estimated useful lives under the straight-line
method, or (2) as income is actually earned from
exploiting the asset under the income-forecast
method (which has a maximum write-off period of
11 years).31
Under this framework, Individual A’s patent
acquired as part of a business acquisition is subject
to ratable 15-year amortization (which may be
shorter or longer than the actual useful life of the
patent), but Individual B’s patent acquired sepa
rately benefits from more rapid depreciation allow
ances (shorter useful life under the straight-line
method or accelerated allowances under the
income-forecast method).
The disparate tax treatment between A and B
raises some interesting questions: Is it logical that
all patents — regardless of type or remaining useful
life — acquired along with a business are grouped
into a single category with the same recovery
method and period, while patents acquired sepa
rately are depreciated using an asset-by-asset ap
proach? If patents derived their value from their
relationship to a product, service, or goodwill of a

28

Section 167(g)(8)(A), amended by the Tax Increase Preven
tion and Reconciliation Act of 2005, P.L. 109-222 (providing that
a taxpayer may elect to ratably deduct the costs of acquiring any
musical composition or any copyright regarding musical com
position property over a five-year period instead of using the
income-forecast method). Note the election does not apply for
any tax year beginning after December 31, 2010. Section
167(g)(8)(E).
29
Section 167(f).
30
Section 197(e)(3)-(4).
31
For patents and copyrights acquired outside the context of
a business acquisition, tax depreciation rules that were appli
cable before 1993 generally continue to apply. Section 167; reg.
section 1.167(a)-3(a) and -14(c). Under the income-forecast
method, the depreciation allowance in any given year is com
puted by multiplying the original acquisition cost by a fraction,
the numerator of which is income from the intellectual property
for the tax year and the denominator of which is forecasted total
income to be earned in connection with the intellectual property
during its useful life. See Rev. Rul. 60-358, 1960-2 C.B. 68,
supplemented by Rev. Rul. 64-272, 1964-2 C.B., supplemented by
Rev. Rul. 79-285, 1979-2 C.B. 91. In 1997 Congress codified the
income-forecast method of depreciation in section 167(g), pro
viding a maximum recovery period of 11 years for incomeforecast property. Section 167(g), amended by the Small Business
Job Protection Act of 1996, P.L. 104-188. Forecasted total income
includes all income the taxpayer reasonably believes will be
earned during the 11-year period beginning with the year the
property is placed in service. Section 167(g)(1)(A) and (g)(5)(A).
In the 11th year, a taxpayer may deduct any unrecovered costs
left in the property. Section 167(g)(1)(C).

(C) Tax Analysts 2011. All rights reserved. Tax Analysts does not claim copyright in any public domain or third party content.

copyrighted software and graphic designs and
package designs used in advertising.
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We believe that the depreciation schedule for
patents, copyrights, and software need not neces
sarily parallel the arbitrary depreciation schedule
applicable to intangibles acquired in a business
acquisition that lack inherent value (such as trade
marks and trade names). Indeed, an argument
could be made that if two patents or two copyrights
are capable of reasonable valuation and have rela
tively similar commercial lives, they should be
subject to similar tax rules no matter how acquired.
Example 4: Patent Purchase for Contingent
Payments. ABC Inc. purchases a patent that
has a remaining legal life of 18 years, as part of
the acquisition of a trade or business. XYZ Inc.
purchases a similar patent, which was not
acquired as part of the acquisition of a busi
ness. Both ABC Inc. and XYZ Inc. agree to pay
their respective transferors contingent pay
ments under identical, agreed-on formulas.
As consideration, intellectual property buyers
may make upfront principal payments, installment
payments of a fixed amount, payments contingent
on exploitation of the intellectual property, or use
any combination of these. When contingent pay
ments are made, depreciation rules differ depend
ing on whether the intellectual property is acquired
with a trade or business or acquired separately.
Under current tax rules, if a contingent payment is
made for a patent acquired with a business, the
contingent amount is written off over a 15-year
period.33 If, however, a contingent payment is made
for a patent acquired separately, the contingent

32

Trademarks, in part, derive their value from goodwill. See
1 J. Thomas McCarthy, Trademarks and Unfair Competition, sec
tions 2:18-19 (4th ed. 2008). The value of patents, however, stems
from the owner’s ability to ‘‘exclude others from making, using,
selling, or offering for sale the invention within the United
States’’ for a set number of years. 5 Donald S. Chisum, Chisum on
Patents, section 16.01 (2010).
33
Reg. section 1.197-2(f)(2)(i) (‘‘Any amount that is properly
included in basis of an amortizable section 197 intangible after
the first month of the 15-year period . . . and before the expira
tion of that period is amortized ratably over the remainder of
the 15-year period’’).
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amount is fully deductible in the year paid.34 As can
be seen, ABC Inc. and XYZ Inc. in the example
above are treated vastly different for tax purposes,
even though both appear to be similarly situated.
The apparent rationale behind permitting an
immediate deduction for separately acquired pat
ents is that each contingent payment reflects the
annual cost of the patent and a current deduction
properly matches expenses with income.35 How
ever, the same policy can support deductions for all
contingent payments, regardless of whether the
patent is acquired separately or with a trade or
business. Any concerns about valuing intangibles
acquired in a business acquisition or allocating the
purchase price among acquired intangibles should
be nonexistent when contingent payments are in
volved.
Unequal Tax Treatment of IP Dispositions
Like the taxation of intellectual property devel
opment and acquisition costs, the tax treatment of
intellectual property transfers raises several equity
concerns. Consider examples 5-8 below.
Example 5: Patent Assignment. Individual A,
a freelance inventor, sells one of his many
developed patents to a third party for $100.
XYZ Inc., a small research company that con
ducts its own research, sells one of its many
developed patents to a third party for $100.
Although one would expect the tax system to
treat Individual A and XYZ Inc. similarly, that is not
the case. Individual A’s gain will be treated as
capital gain under the section 1235 safe-harbor
provision, while XYZ Inc.’s gain will be treated as
ordinary income under the code’s general charac
terization provisions.36
Section 1235 requires that the transferor be a
statutorily defined holder of the patent — that is,
any individual whose personal efforts created the
patent property — to be guaranteed capital gains

34
Under this approach, known as the variable contingent
payment method of depreciation, a taxpayer adds the contin
gent payment to the basis of the patent and then immediately
takes a depreciation deduction for an equal amount. The
government has sanctioned the variable contingent payment
method. See reg. section 1.167(a)-14(c)(4); see also Associated
Patentees Inc. v. Commissioner, 4 T.C. 979, 985-987 (1945), acq.,
1959-2 C.B. 3; Rev. Rul. 67-136, 1967-1 C.B. 58 (following the
Associated Patentees decision).
35
Associated Patentees, 4 T.C. at 986 (concluding that a current
deduction for the entire contingent payment gives the taxpayer
‘‘a reasonable, and not more than a reasonable,’’ depreciation
allowance).
36
Section 1222 (requiring the sale or exchange of a capital
asset for preferential capital gains treatment), section 1221(a)(1)
(excluding inventory from the definition of capital asset), and
section 1231(b)(1)(A) (excluding inventory from the definition of
quasi-capital asset).
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(C) Tax Analysts 2011. All rights reserved. Tax Analysts does not claim copyright in any public domain or third party content.

business, as do trademarks or trade names, it might
be justifiable to provide an arbitrary recovery pe
riod to avoid messy valuation and intangible asset
allocation problems. However, the value of a patent
acquired as part of the purchase of a trade or
business is not necessarily tied to the goodwill of
the acquired trade or business.32 Rather, patents can
be freely sold, assigned, or transferred without
associated goodwill or other business assets. The
same is true of copyrights.
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industry.43 Apparently, songwriters make on aver
age about $4,700,44 less money than other artists,
and presumably need the benefit of a reduced
capital gains rate (currently 0 percent at that level of
income from songwriting). The problem with this
thinking is that $4,700 of income is below the level
at which any federal income tax is required; also,
many songwriters have multimillion-dollar in
comes that now enjoy a maximum 15 percent
capital gains rate (in contrast to the current top rate
on ordinary income of 35 percent). As Prof. Calvin
Johnson has recently argued as part of the Shelf
Project, this is unfair.45

Section 1235 was enacted in 1954 with section 174
primarily to encourage research activity and stimu
late economic growth and technological develop
ment.40 So why does section 1235 provide statutory
assurance to individuals, but not corporations, that
the sale of their patents will produce capital gains?

Example 7: Copyright Assignment. Indi
vidual A sells copyrighted software that she
created for $100. XYZ Inc. sells similar copy
righted software that was created by its em
ployees for $100.

Example 6: Copyright Assignment. A song
writer sells one of his copyrighted songs for
$100. A painter sells one of his copyrighted
paintings for $100.
Songwriters are subject to capital gains tax rates
on the sales of their songs, rather than to higher
personal income tax rates, because of a special code
provision enacted in 2006 governing musical com
positions and the copyrights on them.41 Peculiarly,
capital gains treatment is not available to other
individual artists such as novelists, painters, sculp
tors, and designers because of the general rule
enacted in 1950 that inventory and self-created
works are not capital assets.42 Thus, the copyright
creators in this example are treated vastly different
for tax purposes even though the intangible legal
protections assigned are similar.
Special capital gains treatment for songwriters
was a result of pressure from the country music

37

Section 1235(a) and (b)(1); reg. section 1.1235-2(d)(1)(i). An
original inventor’s employer would not qualify as a holder
‘‘even though he may be the equitable owner of the patent by
virtue of an employment relationship with the inventor.’’ S. Rep.
No. 83-1622, at 423 (1954).
38
Section 1221(a)(1) (excluding from capital asset definition
inventory and inventory-like property).
39
Section 1211(a).
40
See S. Rep. No. 83-1622, at 439 (1954) (stating that a policy
goal underlying section 1235’s enactment was ‘‘to provide an
incentive to inventors to contribute to the welfare of the
Nation’’).
41
Section 1221(b)(3).
42
Section 1221(a)(3) (excluding self-created copyrighted
works from the definition of capital asset); section 1231(b)(1)(C)
(excluding self-created copyrighted works from the definition of
section 1231 property).
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Although individual copyright creators have or
dinary gain on the sale of their works (with the
exception of musical copyrights, as noted above),
corporate copyright creators may be eligible for
capital gains treatment on the sale of works created
by their employees and individual contractors.46
This additional distinction arises because some au
thority suggests the capital-asset exception for selfcreated property does not apply to non-individual
creators, such as corporations, the employees or
independent contractors of which created the copy
rights.47 These distinctions, like those identified in
the examples above, seem to lack any theoretical
justification.
Example 8: Intellectual Property Charitable
Donation. ABC Inc. donates intellectual prop
erty worth $100 to a large university that will
use the intellectual property in ways that will
directly generate income. XYZ Inc. donates
similar intellectual property worth $100 to a
small college that emphasizes education and
basic research.
Before 2004 the tax code would have granted
both companies an initial tax deduction for the

43
Brody Mullins, ‘‘Music to Songwriters’ Ears: Lower Taxes
— Country Artists’ Group Presses Lawmakers to Slash the Levy
on Lyricists,’’ The Wall Street Journal, Nov. 29, 2005.
44
Id. (2005 estimates).
45
Calvin H. Johnson, ‘‘Cleaning Compensation for Services
Out of Capital Gain,’’ Tax Notes, Jan. 11, 2010, p. 233, Doc
2009-27878, 2010 TNT 9-5.
46
Sections 1221 and 1222.
47
See Rev. Rul. 55-706, 1955-2 C.B. 300, superseded by Rev. Rul.
62-141, 1962-2 C.B. 181 (applying inventory exclusion, but not
copyright exclusion, suggesting that the copyright exclusion
does not apply to works-for-hire creations); see also Desilu Prods.
Inc. v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1965-307 (same).

(C) Tax Analysts 2011. All rights reserved. Tax Analysts does not claim copyright in any public domain or third party content.

treatment.37 In this example, Individual A can
qualify for capital gains treatment under section
1235 even though the subject of the sale (the inven
tory being sold) is not considered a capital asset
under general characterization principles.38 XYZ
Inc.’s assignment, however, will not qualify for
section 1235 treatment but will instead be treated as
a sale of a noncapital asset yielding ordinary in
come. Although corporations do not get lower rates
on their capital gains, these gains can be used by
corporations to absorb capital losses that the corpo
rations may have.39
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Conclusion
Intellectual property is subject to many tax in
equities throughout its life cycle (development,
acquisition, and transfer). Many of these inequities
encourage intellectual property developers, pur
chasers, and assignors to plan transactions that
minimize taxes. For example, if a taxpayer identifies
a business’s patent that it would like to purchase for
contingent payments, the taxpayer receives greater
immediate tax deductions if it can negotiate the
purchase of the patent separately from the seller’s
other business assets.54 Further, a taxpayer planning
to donate income-generating intellectual property
to a charity will receive larger tax deductions if it

donates the property to a donee that can use the
intellectual property in ways that will directly gen
erate income rather than to a non-commercially
driven donee.55 These decisions should be tax neu
tral, but under the present tax system, they are not.
An optimal intellectual property tax system would
not interfere with intellectual property owners’
economic behavior and would avoid dead-weight
losses caused by the restructuring of intellectual
property transactions to minimize taxes.56
Several explanations can be offered for the un
equal tax treatment of intellectual property. First,
tax inequities may be inevitable because of the
unique nature of intangible intellectual property
rights. Compared with land, for example, intellec
tual property rights involve such a broad range of
economic activities that no two taxpayers will be
situated similarly. Second, tax inequities may result
when the tax system does not adequately respond
to changing intellectual property policies and the
realities of today’s economy. Tax rules enacted in
the 1950s, for instance, may not adequately recog
nize the evolution of intellectual property, the emer
gence of new intellectual property forms, and
modern intellectual property practices and trends.
Third, tax inequities may be intentional. The design
of any tax system involves trade-offs between vary
ing tax policy goals. Thus, to achieve administrative
efficiencies or to promote economic growth, the
government may decide inequities are justifiable.
A plausible explanation for many of the inequi
ties identified in this report may be that tax rules
governing intellectual property evolved in the ab
sence of an appropriate legal framework for the
intersection of the intellectual property and taxation
schemes — one that considers the soundness of tax
distinctions. Special tax rules governing intellectual
property evolved slowly and separately from sub
stantive intellectual property laws, and were de
signed chiefly to enhance administrative efficiencies
by resolving dissonance that occurred when tradi
tional principles of taxation were used to resolve
early tax disputes.57 An appropriate legal frame
work for intellectual property taxation might con
sider the following questions: Should the status of
intellectual property owners (individuals versus
corporations) dictate tax results? Should the
methods of payment (lump sum versus contingent

48

Reg. section 1.170A-1(c); Rev. Rul. 58-260, 1958-1 C.B. 126.
Section 170(e)(1)(B)(iii), amended by American Jobs Creation
Act of 2004, P.L. 108-357.
50
See supra examples 1-2.
51
Section 170(m).
52
Id.
53
For a critique of the 2004 changes, see Nguyen and Maine,
‘‘Giving Intellectual Property,’’ 39 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 1721 (2006).
54
See supra Example 4.
49
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55

See supra Example 8.
Graetz and Schenk, supra note 4, at 29 (stating that effi
ciency requires a tax to interfere as little as possible with
people’s economic behavior); Elkins, supra note 9, at 47 (stating
that efficient taxes minimize dead-weight losses caused by
taxpayer actions to reduce tax burden by choosing courses of
action that minimize tax).
57
See Nguyen and Maine, supra note 3.
56

937

(C) Tax Analysts 2011. All rights reserved. Tax Analysts does not claim copyright in any public domain or third party content.

same amount — the fair market value of the do
nated property.48 As a result of amendments in
2004, however, the code does not grant either com
pany an FMV deduction in the year of the gift.49
Under current rules, the initial deduction for chari
table gifts of any type of intellectual property is
typically the property’s tax basis. Often the donor’s
tax basis in intellectual property is very small; in
many cases, the donor’s basis is zero because de
velopment costs were deducted when incurred.50
But that’s not the end of the story. To encourage
charitable giving of intellectual property, Congress
deemed it appropriate to grant donors of intellec
tual property future charitable deductions based on
the income received by the donee charity.51 Specifi
cally, the donor can take a deduction for up to 10
years for gifts of royalty-producing intellectual
property to public charities, but the amount of the
charitable deduction declines over time.52
In this example, ABC Inc. will enjoy future chari
table tax deductions equal to a percentage of the
royalty income earned by its chosen donee, the
commercially driven university. Because the small
college’s use of XYZ Inc.’s donated intellectual
property will not directly generate income, XYZ Inc.
will receive no tax benefit for its charitable gift. In
practice, charitable deduction rules favor intellec
tual property used in applied research over similar
intellectual property used for fundamental or
purely scientific research, and favor donors who
give to donees with the physical facilities, financial
resources, and personnel capability to exploit intel
lectual property solely for direct financial results.53
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payments) in intellectual property transfers matter
in determining tax outcomes? And should the na
ture of the tangible property embodying intangible
intellectual property rights (book versus song) be
relevant, or should tax results be determined based
solely on the nature of intellectual property rights
involved?
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